Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Learning of equilibria and misperceptions in hypergames with perfect observations
B. Gharesifard, J. Cortés
Proceedings of the American Control Conference, San Francisco, California, USA, 2011, pp. 4045-4050
Abstract
This paper studies the learning of equilibria in adversarial
situations when players may have misperceptions about the game they
are involved in with their opponents. We use the concept of
high-level hypergames to model these scenarios. By drawing
connections with the theory of ordinal potential games, we establish
that players in a hypergame can individually learn their perceived
equilibria using any improving adjustment scheme. We investigate
how players can incorporate the information gained from observing
the opponents' actions by updating different levels of her
perception. We introduce high-level perception updating algorithms
for resolving possible inconsistencies in perceptions using
self-blaming or opponent-blaming strategies. Finally, we establish
that when all players are rational and have perfect observation
about past outcomes, the repeated play of the hypergame converges to
an equilibrium.
pdf   |
  ps.gz
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr,
La Jolla, California, 92093-0411
Ph: 1-858-822-7930
Fax: 1-858-822-3107
cortes at ucsd.edu
Skype id:
jorgilliyo