Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Stealthy strategies for deception in hypergames with asymmetric information
B. Gharesifard, J. Cortés
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and
European Control Conference, Orlando, Florida, USA, 2011, pp. 5762-5767
Abstract
This paper considers games with incomplete
asymmetric information, where one player (the
deceiver) has privileged information about the other
(the mark) and intends to employ it for belief
manipulation. We use hypergames to represent the
asymmetric information available to players and
assume a probabilistic model for the actions of the
mark. This framework allows us to formalize various
notions of deception in a precise way. We provide a
necessary condition and a sufficient condition for
deceivability when the deceiver is allowed to reveal
information to the mark as the game evolves. For
the case when the deceiver acts stealthily, i.e.,
restricts her actions to those that do not
contradict the belief of the mark, we are able to
fully characterize when deception is possible.
Moreover, we design the worst-case max-strategy
that, when such a sequence of deceiving actions
exists, is guaranteed to find it. An example
illustrates our results.
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Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
University of California, San Diego
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