Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Exploration of misperceptions in hypergames
B. Gharesifard, J. Cortés
Allerton Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing, Monticello, Illinois, USA, 2011, pp. 1565-1570
Abstract
This paper studies adversarial scenarios within the
framework of hypergames, where rational players have
misperceptions about the game they are involved in. We
introduce the notion of inconsistent equilibrium to
capture those equilibria of the hypergame that are not
perceived by at least one player as an equilibrium in
her own game. We identify a class of actions, termed
exploratory, that a player can take from an inconsistent
equilibrium to improve her payoff (even though such
actions are perceived to be sanctioned by other
players). We analyze the asymptotic convergence
properties of the resulting dynamical system and
characterize to what extent misperception can be
decreased by the use of exploratory actions. We
illustrate our results with an example.
pdf   |
  ps.gz
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr,
La Jolla, California, 92093-0411
Ph: 1-858-822-7930
Fax: 1-858-822-3107
cortes at ucsd.edu
Skype id:
jorgilliyo