Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria by adversarial networks
with directed topologies
B. Gharesifard, J. Cortés
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control and European Control Conference, Maui, Hawaii,
USA, 2012, pp. 5786-5791
Abstract
This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two
cooperative groups of agents have opposing objectives with regards
to the optimization of a common objective function. In the
resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with
neighbors in their respective network and have only partial
knowledge of the state of the agents in the other network. We
consider scenarios where the interaction topology within each
cooperative network is given by a strongly connected and
weight-balanced directed graph. We introduce a provably-correct
distributed dynamics which converges to the set of Nash equilibria
when the objective function is strictly concave-convex,
differentiable, with globally Lipschitz gradient. The technical
approach combines tools from algebraic graph theory, dynamical
systems, convex analysis, and game theory.
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Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr,
La Jolla, California, 92093-0411
Ph: 1-858-822-7930
Fax: 1-858-822-3107
cortes at ucsd.edu
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