Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Distributed linear programming and bargaining in exchange networks
D. Richert, J. Cortés
Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Washington, D.C., USA, 2013, pp. 4624-4629
Abstract
Many engineering, economic, and social scenarios are modeled as
neighboring agents in a network interacting with each other. In the
setup we consider, neighboring agents (i) bargain over the
possibility of matching with at most one other agent and (ii) agree
on how to allocate a common good between them. In particular, we
examine stable and fair outcomes called Nash bargaining
solutions. Our main contribution is the design of continuous-time
distributed dynamics that converge to these Nash solutions. The
technical approach leads us to develop distributed dynamics for
linear programming, the results of which are of independent
interest. We invoke Lyapunov techniques in our convergence proofs
and draw results from nonsmooth and set-valued analysis of dynamical
systems. In the literature pertinent to bargaining problems of the
form we consider, this control perspective is unique.
pdf   |
  ps.gz
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering,
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr,
La Jolla, California, 92093-0411
Ph: 1-858-822-7930
Fax: 1-858-822-3107
cortes at ucsd.edu
Skype id:
jorgilliyo