Jorge Cortés
Professor
Cymer Corporation Endowed Chair
Stealthy deception in hypergames under informational asymmetry
B. Gharesifard, J. Cortés
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems 44 (6) (2014), 785-795
Abstract
This paper considers games of incomplete information, where one
player (the deceiver) has an informational advantage over the other
(the mark) and intends to employ it for belief manipulation. We use
the formalism of hypergames to represent the asymmetric information
available to players. This framework allows us to formalize various
notions of belief manipulation that revolve around the idea of the
deceiver being able to make the mark believe that a particular
action has lost its advantageous character. In the case when the
deceiver does not mind revealing information to the mark as the game
evolves, we provide a necessary condition and a sufficient condition
for deceivability. In the case when the deceiver acts in a stealthy
way, i.e., restricts its actions to those that do not contradict the
belief of the mark, we fully characterize when deception is possible
and design the "worst-case max-strategy" to find a sequence of
deceiving actions. Our correctness guarantees for this strategy are
based on a precise characterization of the acyclic structure of
subjective hypergames. An example illustrates our results.
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